Michigan Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 2

1952

THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND
THE SUPREME COURT
Paul G. Kauper
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul G. Kauper, THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, 51
MICH. L. REV. 141 (1952).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN
VoL 51

LAW

DECEMBER, 1952

REVIEW
No.

2

THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT
AND THE SUPREME COURT
Paul G. Kauper*

Q

relating to the legislative authority of Congress and of
the several states have given rise to an immense mass of
constitutional litigation ever since the time that the Supreme
Court in Marbury v. Madison1 asserted its power of judicial review.
Many of these cases have turned on the division of legislative authority
between Congress and the state legislatures under our federal system.2
Yet within this same span of time relatively few cases have arisen to
challenge the assertions of presidential power, and in only a few instances has the Court found occasion to speak at length on the questions relating to the Chief Executive's powers under the Constitution
and the division of authority between him and Congress. This is not
to indicate that the question of executive authority has been an uninportant one in American history. Problems relating thereto have arisen
more frequently than indicated by the .number of litigated cases.3
UESTIONS

"' Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
2 The problems here fall into two general categories, i.e. (I) whether legislation
enacted by Congress is supported by powers expressly or impliedly delegated to Congress
under the Constitution, and (2) what is the effect of the delegation to Congress of a given
legislative power, with respect to the power of the states to legislate in the same area.
illustrative of the second category is the question raised as to the power of the states to
regulate interstate commerce. Congress has the plenary power to regulate commerce.
Does this preclude all state power on the theory of exclusive grant of authority to
Congress over the subject? Does it admit of a concurrent power in the states subject to the
paramount power of Congress? In any event it is clear that whatever authority the states
have in this area is subject to the paramount power of Congress and the policies defined
by it. The will and purpose of Congress have emerged as the dominant emphasis in the
determination of these issues. See Dowling, "Interstate Commerce and State Power," 27
VA. L. REv. 1 (1940) and ''Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version," 47
CoL. L. REv. 547 (1947).
Does the judicial technique for treatment of the problems of state power in regard to
interstate commerce suggest a parallel approach to the questions respecting division of
authority between Congress and the President? See note 120 infra.
3 For treatment of these problems by text writers, see BERDAHL, WAR PoWBRs OF nm
ExBcUTIVB IN nm UNITED STATES (1921); CoRWIN, nm PRBSIDBNT-OFFICB AND
PoWBns (1948 ed.); CoRWIN, ToTAL WAR AND nm CoNSTITUTION (1947); RICH, nm
PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL ThsoRDER (1941); RossITBR, CoNsTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP
(1948); TBB SuPRBMB CoURl' AND nm CoMMANDER IN CHIEF (1951).
1
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Various Presidents have asserted on occasions a broad position in respect to the prerogatives of their office and have taken actions, often
under circumstances that effectively precluded judicial review, premised on such a position.4 The broad view of presidential prerogative
was stated in its classic form by President Theodore Roosevelt when he
enunciated his famous theory that the President as a general steward
has the power and the duty to take such steps as he deems essential
to the welfare of the nation, subject only to the explicit prohibitions
of the Constitution:' But the authoritative cases that came before the
Supreme Court dealt only with facets of presidential power in limited
areas and invited no panoramic survey of executive authority.6 Largely
untouched by judicial decision and opinion were the questions relating to the President's prerogative in the :field of domestic affairs. We
may put aside the many cases that arose for judicial determination
of executive authority within the framework of statutes pursuant to
which Congress had delegated power to the President, although it is
not irrelevant to observe that the invalidation in several instances of
statutes delegating too broad an authority to the executive assumed
without question the hegemony of Congress in areas of legislative
power and policy.7 But the very important problem of executive
power, unaided by legislative scaffolding, to deal with important nonmilitary problems of domestic concern, particularly those assuming the
proportions of an internal emergency, had never squarely presented
itself until the Court was confronted with President Truman's seizure
of the steel mills in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer. 8
The extraordinarily vigorous and aggressive assertion of presidential authority in recent decades with respect to the shaping and determination of fundamental policy questions added new importance to the
problem. Moreover, the role of the Supreme Court in meeting the
4 See the instances of executive action reviewed by Chief Justice Vinson in his dissenting opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 at 683-700, 72
S.Ct. 863 (1952); also the authorities cited in note 3 supra.
5 THEODORE RoosBVELT, AuroBIOGRAPHY 378, 388-389 (1916 ed.). Cf. WILLIAM
HowARD TAFT, Otm CHIBF MAaxsTRATB AND Hxs PoWBRS 88, 139-147 (1916); also
Taft's opinion as Chief Justice in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 at 133, 47 S.Ct.
21 (1926).
6 See the review of the leading cases at pp. 144-150 infra.
7 See Panama Relining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241 (1935) (provision
of National Industrial Recovery Act delegating authority to President to prohibit interstate
shipments of "hot oil" held invalid); Schecter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55
S.Ct. 837 (1935) (provision of National Industrial Recovery Act delegating authority to
President to approve codes of fair competition for industry held invalid).
s 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952).
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problem was shadowed by the increased reluctance on the Court's part
in recent decades to assert an independent authority in reviewing new
extensions of federal powers when asserted by the legislative branch
of the federal government.9 Indeed, the whole process of judicial review in major areas of constitutional law had been diluted by a deliberately assumed judicial attitude of self-restraint in deference to
legislative action on both the national and state levels, particularly
when such legislation impinged upon private economic right.10 Would
the Court look with the same tolerance upon executive action designed
to subordinate private right to the executive's conception of the' general welfare, employing some Hexible standard of "reasonableness,"
and invoking a presumption of constitutionality? Might the Court
even avoid the question by positing an immunity to judicial review
of an asserted exercise of executive prerogative thus leaving it to Congress and the electorate to check presidential power by means within
their authority? Or would the assertion by the President of autonomous
authority under the Constitution be seen to face the Court with an
inevitable but unenviable job of umpiring the federal system and
determining the respective areas of congressional and presidential
powers, a job that would ultimately force the high tribunal to reveal
its fundamental predilections in choosing between Congress and the
President? It is in the setting of these larger questions that the Youngstown case assumes a significance of large dimensions, a significance
9 See, for instance, Wickard v. Fillbum, 317 U.S. lll, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942) (upholding power of Congress under Commerce Clause to limit production by farmer of wheat for
his own use); United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546,
66 S.Ct. 715 (1946) (the majority opinion in this case, in upholding an exercise of eminent domain power by the federal government, took the position that a determination by
Congress that a taking was for a public use was not subject to judicial review); Woods v.
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 68 S.Ct. 421 (1948) (sustaining federal rent control under the
Housing and Rent Control Act of 1947).
10 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934) (sustaining a state
statute fixing minimum prices on sale of milk and positing a general standard of "reasonableness" as the guide to judicial review under due process clause); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct. 778 (1938) (upholding federal statute prohibiting interstate shipment of filled milk products, with reliance by the Court on a presumption of rationality of legislative action); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron
& Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251 (1949) (upholding state legislation forbidding
discrimination by employers against non-union employees and stating the position, per
Black, J., that state legislation is not to be held invalid unless it violates some specific prohibition of the Constitution or a federal statute). Justice Black has repeatedly characterized
as "frivolous" the attempts to claim protection for economic liberty and property rights
under the due process clause. See, for instance, Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil &
Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 71 S.Ct. 215 (1950). See also his dissenting opinion in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947) stating his objection to the judicially
formulated "fundamental rights" interpretation of the due process clause of_ the Fourteenth
Amendment as an expression of judicial subjectivity.

144

M1cmGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

exceeding the importance of the controversy's immediate impact on the
problems of the steel strike with all of its economic and political repercussions.

I
Article II of the Constitution and the Prior Cases
The powers of the President are stated in Article II. According to
the first clause of section 1, "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." Section 2 designates the
President as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States...." Under this same section the President is authorized to make treaties with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate.
The closing clause of section 3 declares that the President "shall take
care that the Laws be faithfully executed ...." The remaining parts
of the second article grant the President specific authority in regard
to such matters as the appointment of federal officers and the granting of
pardons and a limited part in the legislative process by means of his authority to call Congress into special session, recommend legislation and
veto laws passed by Congress. In so far as any broad claims of presidential prerogative rest upon the language of the Constitution and find support in a delegated power theory, they must be derived from the
clauses vesting the executive authority in him, constituting him the
head of the armed forces and imposing on him the duty to enforce the
laws. Such a claim must also be viewed in the light of the first section
of Article I which vests in the Congress all the legislative powers delegated to the federal government under the Constitution.
As previously indicated, the judicial decisions dealing with the scope
of presidential power are relatively few. A summary examination and
classification of these cases is necessary to serve as a background for
the detailed discussion of the Youngstown case that appears below. The
prior decisions fall into several classes.
First of all, mention may be made of United States 11. CurtissWright Export Corporation,11 upholding a criminal statute making
it unlawful to ship munitions to the South American countries engaged in the Chaco conB.ict if the President determined that such an
embargo would promote termination of the conB.ict. In disposing of
the contention that the statute was unconstitutional as an invalid delegation of legislative power to the President, the Court declared that
11299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216 (1936).
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this ground of attack was irrelevant in the field of foreign affairs where
the federal government's authority to act was an inherent concomitant
of nationality and not derived by delegation from the Constitution
and an area where the President by virtue of his office enjoyed a plenary
and exclusive power "as the sole organ of the federal government ...
a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress ...." The language of this case goes to the extreme in formulation of a constitutional theory to support the claim of presidential
prerogative where the conduct of foreign affairs is concerned, particularly so since it rests upon a novel and dubious conception of inherent rather than delegated power. This case is mentioned first since
it deals with the only area of presidential authority where the Court
has elaborated the theory of an inherently broad power of the President
stemming from the character of his office. In passing, it is relevant to
note that much of the language of the case can be rejected as dictum
since Congress had delegated authority to the President to deal with
the problem, so that the result of the case could easily have been justified either on a theory of executive authority concurrent with, and
subject to, the paramount power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce, or on a simple theory of delegation of legislative power by
Congress.12
The second type of case concerns the President's military powers
stemming from his constitutionally created status as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy. This area has been provocative of the
greatest number of cases that have arisen to challenge assertions of
executive power.13 Two principal cases stand out in this group and
are usually cited in any discussion of presidential powers. The Prize
Cases1 4 upheld the action of President Lincoln in declaring, as a war
measure, a blockade of ports in Southern states that had seceded from
the Union. In upholding the President's action in taking measures
to resist the armed rebellion, the Court stated that the Constitution
"confers on the President the whole Executive power." It made reference to his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed
12 See Justice Jackson's discussions of the case in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 at 635-636, footnote 2, 72 S.Ct. 863
(1952).
13 On the general subject, see the authorities cited in note 3 supra. Also, see White,
"The War Powers of the President," 1943 W1s. L. R:sv. 205. The Civil War questions
are thoroughly treated in RANDALL, CoNsTITanONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LrncoLN (1926).
An extensive citation of the cases dealing with seizure of property for military purposes
appears in the Brief for Petitioner, pp. 121-139, in the Youngstown case.
142 Black (67 U.S.) 635 (1863).
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and to his status as Commander in Chief of the armed force~ and concluded that the question whether the President in suppressing an insurrection had met with such resistance and a civil war of such proportions as to warrant the designation of those engaged in the rebellion as belligerents within the meaning of international law, was a
question to be decided by him. Certainly the case on its facts indicates
nothing more than a liberal construction of the military powers of the
President in a distinctively military situation. Even this view of the
case is weakened by the Court's reference to prior legislation by Congress authorizing the President to employ the armed forces of the
United States in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to suppress
insurrection against the government of a state or of the United States.
Moreover, the Court observed that any necessity for reconciling the
presidential action with the power of Congress to declare war was
answered by the action of Congress in ratifying President Lincoln's
conduct. Even in the setting of this military situation the Court was
mindful of the problem of reconciling the claim of presidential prerogative with the legislative supremacy of Congress.15
The other oft-cited case dealing with a military problem also grew
out of the Civil War. United States v. Russell16 upheld the plaintiff's
right to compensation for the taking of his vessels which were requisitioned by Union officers in order to transport military supplies. The
seizure was sustained as a lawful act and accordingly compensation was
required to be paid.17 In sustaining a war-time requisitioning of prop15 Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866), holding invalid a trial by a
military tribunal of a civilian during the Civil War in an area that was not a theatre of war.
It is of special interest here to note that four judges who concurred in the result did so on
the ground that Congress had not expressly authorized such military trials. Similarly, a
majority of the Court in Duncan v. Kanahamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 66 S.Ct. 606 (1946),
where the Court invalidated military trials of civilians in Hawaii during World War II,
rested their decision on the ground that the executive action directing such trials was not
authorized by Congress when it passed the Hawaiian Organic Act.
For a recognition of concurrence in some instances of legislative authority over military
matters with the President's powers as Commander in Chief, see Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943), where the Court upheld a conviction under
the Act of Congress of March 21, 1942 (56 Stat. L. 173), making it a misdemeanor knowingly to disregard restrictions made applicable by a military commander in a military area
prescribed by him as such, when authorized by an Executive Order of the President, where
the defendant had violated a military curfew order directed against persons of Japanese
ancestry and authorized by the President's Executive Order of March 18, 1942. The Court
treated the case as one raising the question whether Congress and the Executive, acting in
cooperation, had constitutional authority to impose the curfew restriction, and said it was
unnecessary to consider whether the President, acting alone, could lawfully have made the
order in question.
16 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 623 (1872).
17 Cf. Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. (54 U.S.) 115 (1852), upholding a personal
action against an officer of the United States Army for seizure of a wagon train during
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erty needed for military purposes, without the aid of express statutory
authorization, the case suggests no extraordinary conception of executive power.18 But the following language used by the Court in the case
has often been referred to as supporting a claim of executive prerogative to take appropriate steps, including the seizure of property, to
meet an emergency situation:
"Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, beyond all doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of
immediate and impending public danger, in which private property may be impressed into the public service, or may be seized
and appropriated to the public use, or may even be destroyed
without the consent of the owner. Unquestionably such extreme
cases may arise, as where the property taken is imperatively necessary in time of war to construct defences for the preservation of a
military post at the moment of an impending attack by the enemy,
or for food or medicine for a sick and famishing army utterly
destitute and without other means of such supplies, or to transport
troops, munitions of war, or clothing to reinforce or supply an
army in a distant field, where the necessity for such reinforcement or supplies is extreme and imperative, to enable those in
command of the post to maintain their position or to repel an
impending attack, provided it appears that other means of transportation could not be obtained, and that the transports impressed
for the purpose were imperatively required for such immediate
use. Where such an extraordinary and unforeseen emergency
occurs in the public service in time of war no doubt is entertained that the power of the government is ample to supply for
the moment the public wants in that way to the extent of the
immediate public exigency, but the public danger must be immediate, imminent, and impending, and the emergency in the public
service must be extreme and imperative, and such as will not admit the delay or a resort to any other source of supply, and the
circumstances must be such as imperatively require the exercise
of that extreme power in respect to the particular property so impressed, appropriated, or destroyed."
the Mexican War where there was no finding of an emergency to warrant seizure as an
official military act of the government. The case is discussed at length in Brief for the
Petitioner, pp. 126-131, in the Youngstown case.
18 The same may be said for President Lincoln's action in directing the seizure of rail
and telegraph lines leading to Washington at a time when armed hostilities had already
interrupted the movement of troops to the capital. This action was later ratified by Congress. See the references to this action in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Youngstown
case, 343 U.S. 579 at 611, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952) and in the Chief Justice's dissenting
opinion at p. 685, where President Lincoln's action is characterized as "a most apt precedent" for President Truman's action in seizing the steel mills.

148

MICHIGAN LAw R:avmw

[ Vol. 51

The third general category deals with domestic matters unrelated
to military objectives. The four cases discussed in chronological order
below fall into this group and must be mentioned since they are usually
cited to support claims of executive prerogative.
In re Neagle19 held that a United States marshal who had been
assigned by the attorney general to protect Justice Field while on tour
of his circuit in California and who killed Terry in the course of an
attack by Terry on the Justice had performed this act in pursuance of
a law of the United States, within the meaning of the federal habeas
corpus statute, with the result that Neagle was ordered free of the
custody of state officers who had held him on a murder charge. No
federal legislation expressly authorized marshals of the United States
to accompany the judges of the Supreme Court through their circuits
and act as bodyguards for them. Nevertheless, Neagle was held to be
. acting in pursuance of a duty under the laws of the United States.
The Court spoke at length of the power of the President, in discharge
of his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, to
take measures for the protection of a federal judge and thereby protect the peace of the United States. In view of the problem presented
to the Court, this invocation of executive power was hardly surprising.
Moreover, and this is significant, the Court did not rest its case completely on executive prerogative since it referred to a provision of the
Revised Statutes dealing with the powers of federal marshals and their
deputies in executing the laws of the United States.
In re Debs2° upheld the injunction obtained by the Attorney General of the United States, restraining Debs and other officers of the
American Railway Union which had called a strike against railroads
carrying Pullman cars, leading to an interference with interstate transportation and the carriage of the mails, from any further acts of obstruction. The argument was made that federal courts were without authority to enjoin conduct interfering with interstate transportation and
the carriage of the mails since Congress had not expressly provided for
the same. Although the argument was made for the government that
the Attorney General had the power, apart from any statute, to take
appropriate steps to protect the public interest, the Court in the end
fell back upon manifestations of congressional policy, as expressed in
various statutes relating to interstate commerce and the mails, to sustain
the injunction.
10
20

135 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 658 (1890).
158 U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900 (1895).
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The problem presented in United States '11. Midwest Oil Company21 was whether the President, without express statutory authorization, could withdraw from private entry or location certain public lands
containing oil deposits and which without such executive order would
have been open to such private entry or location pursuant to the general legislation by Congress on the subject. In sustaining the President's order, as an act done to protect the best interests of the United
States, the Court emphasized that there was no interference with
private rights since there was no pre-existing right to public lands,
that the President was acting to protect the proprietary interests of the
United States, and that Congress in acquiescing over a long period of
years in the executive practice of withdrawing lands from time to time,
had given its consent and had impliedly authorized what the President had done.
Myers '11. United States2 2 upheld the prerogative of the President
in removing, contrary to statute, an officer appointed by the President
and serving in the executive department. 23 This case assumes a special
interest since the President's action was in conflict with congressional
legislation and had to be bottomed squarely on a claim of authority
under Article IL Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Taft declared
that the opening language of section 1 vesting the executive power in
the President was a grant of authority to take appropriate steps with
respect to discharge of executive function. Here was a recognition that
section 1 was something more than just a designation of the title of
the chief executive officer and that it was in itself an undefined grant
of executive power. But then the Chief Justice went on to develop the
argument that the power of appointment implied a power of removal
so that the case could have rested adequately on the theory that the
specific grant of certain powers to the President implied incidental
powers necessary to their effective execution, just as Congress has the
power to enact legislation necessary and proper to effectuate its expressly granted powers.24
In summary the prior decisions pointed to the following results:
with respect to foreign affairs the President has a broad "inherent"
power to take the initiative in defining national policy, although even
21236 U.S. 459, 35 S.Ct. 309 (1915).
22 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926).
23 Justices Holmes, Brandeis and McReynolds dissented.
24 'The President's constitutional power of dismissal was later held to extend only to
officers in the executive department. See Humphrey's Exr. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
55 S.Ct. 869 (1935), holding that the President could remove a Federal Trade Commissioner only for causes specified by Congress.

150

MmmcAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

in this area it has been recognized that Congress in exerc1smg its
legislative powers may effectively nullify presidential action; 25 as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy the President has a constitutional authority to make decisions relating to military operations in
theatres of war, including an authority to order the requisitioning of
supplies needed for a given operation, although this authority in some
of its phases is most aptly described an authority concurrent with, and
subject to, the paramount legislative authority of Congress to declare
war, raise armies and make appropriations; in regard to domestic matters, the President's constitutional authority is limited to the specific
grants of power stated in Article II and powers fairly implied therefrom including a general ministerial power that embraces an authority
to protect federal officers and property and a commission to carry into
execution and to enforce the laws of Congress. Despite the language
used in some opinions and the recognition that section I of Article I
is itself a grant of executive power of undefined dimensions, the decisions viewed on their facts and with respect to the character of the
problem presented, lend no credence to the idea that the President
has the general power to take all steps that he deems appropriate to
the welfare and safety of the United States, nor do they support the
notion that the President in taking care that the laws be faithfully
executed has the general power to implement the legislative policy
of Congress by resorting to measures not embraced within the remedial
and enforcement scheme provided by Congress. Indeed, the Court's
astuteness in the Neagle, Debs and Midwest Oil Company cases, in
reconciling the executive action with the express or implied legislative
policy of Congress pointed to the conclusion that in the area of domestic affairs except as the Constitution specifically conferred authority
on the President in such matters as appointments, etc., the supremacy
of the legislative power was the basic premise in passing on claims of
executive prerogative.
25 Thus the Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion
Case), 130 U.S. 581, 9 S.Ct. 623 (1889), upheld a statute of Congress excluding a certain class of aliens from entering the country even though it conflicted with a prior treaty
entered into between the United States and the Chinese Emperor.
By withholding appropriations or refusing to enact appropriate implementing legislation, Congress can effectively negative treaties, executive agreements and other exercises of
executive initiative in the field of foreign affairs.
The enactment by Congress of the United Nations Participations Act marked an assertion by Congress of a paramount legislative power to control the use of American military
forces in discharging the commitment to the United Nations for the use of troops in police
actions to preserve the peace. See CoRWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 155-157
(1947).
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Against this background we may now examine Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Company 11. Sawyer.

II
The Youngstown Case: Arguments of the Parties
The facts of the case need not be recounted in detail here.26 It is
sufficient to note the salient developments that furnished the setting
for the case as it came before the Supreme Court.
Immediately following the union's call for a strike by the steel mill
employees, after the steel companies had refused to accept the terms
of settlement proposed by the Wage Stabilization Board which had
conducted a hearing and served as a mediation body in accordance with
provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950,27 President Truman, admittedly without express statutory authority, directed seizure of
the mills by the Secretary of Commerce by issuance of Executive Order
l 03402 8 which in its prefatory paragraphs recited the facts pointing
to the imperative importance of continued steel production to the country's defense program and to the discharge of commitments made to
the United Nations and the foreign countries. The Secretary thereupon issued his own possessory orders calling upon the presidents of
the seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United
States and directing them to carry on their activities in accordance with
the Secretary's regulations and directives. Obeying the Secretary's
orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him
in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Charging that the
seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by constitutional
provisions, they prayed for a declaratory judgment declaring the orders
of the President and the Secretary invalid and for the issuance of
preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining the Secretary from
taking any action under the authority of the executive order. The
hearing was then conducted before Judge Pine on the motion for the
preliminary injunction. 29 His decision, supported by a written opin26 The facts are briefly stated in Justice Black's opinion at 343 U.S. 582-584 and at
greater length by Chief Justice Vinson at 667-683.
21 64 Stat. L. 799, 812, as amended 65 Stat. L. 132, 50 U.S.C.A. App. 2081.
2817 FED. REG. 3139 (April 8, 1952). The text of the Order is appended to the
opinion of the Court in the Youngstown case at 343 U.S. 589-592.
29 An extended account of the hearing before Judge Pine appears in Beverly Smith's
article, "What a Spanking He Gave Truman," SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Aug. 2, 1952,
p. 27; see also N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 1952.
The United States Steel Company verbally limited its motion to one for a preliminary
injunction to restrain the Secretary from making any changes in the terms and conditions
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ion,30 upheld the claim of the companies that the President's seizure
action was unlawful and that the circumstances of the case warranted
the exercise by the court of its equity power to issue a preliminary
of employment. In view of his decision finding the Executive Order invalid, Judge Pine
expressed his unwillingness to issue such a limited restraining order ''because of its stultifying implications" and permitted this company to withdraw its verbal amendment and
proceed on the basis of its original motion. See Judge Pine's opinion in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, (D.C. D.C. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 569.
The companies' first attempt to secure a restraining order from the District Court of
the District of Columbia had not been successful. Judge Holtzoff had denied the requested
relief on remedial grounds, asserting that in effect such an injunction would be against the
President of the United States and that the balance of the equities was in favor of the
defendant since there was no showing of irreparable damage and since he was of the
opinion that if the seizure was illegal the companies would have an action for damages
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, (D.C. D.C.
1952) 103 F. Supp. 978. This decision did not bar the later proceeding before Judge Pine
of the same court who, in the course of his opinion justifying the issuance of the preliminary injunction, observed that "although there is no law of the case rule in interlocutory
orders in this jurisdiction, these cases are in a materially different posture than they were
when Judge Holtzoff of this court refused a temporary restraining order in respect of several of them.'' 103 F. Supp. 569 at 573.
aoyoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, (D.C. D.C. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 569.
After pointing out that there was no express grant of power in the Constitution authorizing
the President to direct the seizure, that there was no grant of power from which it could
reasonably be implied, and that there was no statute of Congress authorizing the seizure,
Judge Pine examined the argument that under the Constitution the President has a ''broad
residuum of power" sometimes referred to as "inherent'' power, which justified the seizure
in this case. In rejecting this argument, Judge Pine stated that the office of the President
is subject to the fundamental principle that the Government of the United States is a
government of limited, enumerated, and delegated powers, and that none of the executive
powers enumerated in Article II of the Constitution, whether taken singly or in the aggregate, support a claim of "residuum" or "inherent" power so as to authorize the President to
take such action as he may deem necessary, whenever in his opinion an emergency exists
requiring him to do so in the public interest. The power to provide for the common defense
and general welfare is vested in Congress. Moreover the power of eminent domain is a
legislative and not an executive power. Judge Pine rejected President Theodore Roosevelt's
"stewardship" theory of the office of President as one which does not comport with our
recognized theory of government. On the remedial question, he concluded that this case
did not involve an injunction against the President himself, that the balance of equities
was on the side of the plaintiffs, that monetary recovery would be inadequate, that since
the seizure was unauthorized there could be no recovery under an implied contract and
that there could be no recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In this connection he
observed "that the contemplated strike, if it came, with all its awful results, would be less
injurious to the public than the injury which would flow from a timorous judicial recognition that there is some basis for this claim to unlimited and unrestrained Executive power,
which would be implicit in a failure to grant the injunction.''
It will be noted that Judge Pine rested his decision on the ground of basic lack of
power of the President. to direct the seizure action as an emergency measure and not on
the ground that the President's action was in conflict with the statutory policies and procedures prescribed by Congress. In this respect his opinion anticipated the views expressed
by Justices Black and Douglas when the case was decided by the Supreme Court. See note
63 infra.
The extraordinary claim of executive prerogative, made orally before Judge Pine by
the Assistant Attorney General, lends special significance to the attention given in the
Judge's opinion to the "residuum" or "inherent'' power theory. See note 38 infra.
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injunction in order to restrain the Secretary of Commerce from further continuing his illegal possessions of the mills. The Secretary, represented by the Justice Department, secured a stay of the injunction
from the District Court of Appeals pending appeal to the Supreme
Court, and won a further victory before that tribunal when it refused
the companies' request that the Secretary be enjoined from agreeing
to any changes in the terms of employment pending the appeal.31
The Supreme Court promptly agreed to hear the case and with equal
promptness reversed the District Court of Appeals by ordering the
Secretary to preserve the status quo pending final determination of
the case.32 Thus the stage was set for presentation of arguments before
the Court.33
In attacking the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Pine, the
Solicitor General,34 after reciting at length facts concerning the emergency and the critical importance of steel in view of the nation's defense efforts and its commitments to other nations, made three principal arguments: (1) that there was error in granting a preliminary
injunction both because the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law
and because they had made no showing of injury sufficient to counterbalance the injury to the public interest which would How from the
granting of the injunction; (2) that on the merits the injunction was
not justified since the taking of plaintiffs' property was a valid exercise
of authority conferred on the President by the Constitution and laws
of the United States; (3) that the Labor-Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley) did not preclude the President's emergency action in
this case.
v. United States Steel Co., (D.C. Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 582.
No. 744, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer; No. 745, Sawyer v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 937-939, 72 S.Ct. 775 (1952). Justices Frankfurter and
Burton voted to deny certiorari for immediate review by the Supreme Court of the district
court's decision on the ground that it would be preferable to permit intermediate consideration of the case by the court of appeals.
33 See Brief for Petitioner (No. 745, Oct. Term, 1951) for the arguments in support
of the President's action, and Brief for Respondents (No. 745) for the arguments in behalf
of the steel companies.
34 The Brief for Petitioner was signed by Mr. Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney
General and Solicitor General, Mr. Holmes Baldridge, Assistant Attorney General, and other
attorneys from the Attorney General's staff. Mr. Baldridge had presented the oral arguments before Judge Pine, and Mr. Perlman argued the case for the President before the
Supreme Court. Since the Attorney General's Department represented Secretary Sawyer as
President Truman's agent and since Congress was not represented although its legislative
powers were a vital element of the case, it is somewhat inaccurate to speak of the "Government's" side of the case. In line with the terminology used by Justice Jackson in his
concurring opinion, the references are made in this article to the Solicitor General as representing the President's position.
31 Sawyer
32
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The companies in their joint brief responded with three principal
arguments as follows: (I) that the Secretary's invasion of plaintiffs'
rights was an arbitrary action inconsistent with, and directly contrary
to, the remedy expressly provided by Congress; (2) that the seizure
of plaintiffs' properties and the Secretary's other action, including that
threatened with respect to wages and other conditions of employment,
was unlawful and unconstitutional; (3) that the seizure and the Secretary's threatened action were causing and would cause the plaintiffs
irreparable injury for which they had no adequate remedy at law.
Judging by the briefs and arguments before the Supreme Court,
the remedial issue loomed large. The Solicitor General made this an
issue of primary importance by urging that adherence to accepted
principles of equity jurisprudence precluded the use of the injunction
on the grounds that the damage remedy at law was adequate and that
in any event the balance of equities favored the President's action since
the great public importance in continuation of steel production outweighed any possible invasion of private right. Emphasis on this point
was an important part of the Solicitor General's strategy of avoiding
an adjudication on the merits of the question. The Solicitor General's
brief charged Judge Pine with showing undue haste in wanting to get
at the constitutional problem.35
On the merits of the case, the propositions advanced by the opposing parties boiled down to these differences: the Solicitor General
while recognizing that Congress had not specifically authorized the
President's seizure action, took the position that the President's action,
resting on a repository of power to deal with critical emergency situations, granted under Article II of the Constitution, represented a lawful exercise of executive authority unless this authority was negatived
by the Labor-Management Act, whereas the companies took the position that the President's action was unlawful both because it was precluded by the Labor-Management Act and because the President has
no power directly derived from the Constitution to take this kind
of action but could exercise such power only pursuant to an affirmative
grant by Congress. On the basic constitutional question both parties
recognized the subordination of executive authority in this area of
national policy to the· legislative power of Congress, but the Solicitor
General argued a constitutional power in the President to take appropriate steps to meet an emergency subject to denial or disaffirmance
85 Brief

for Petitioner, p. 50.
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by Congress whereas the companies denied the President's power to
proceed in the absence of prior authorization by Congress. It is important to observe, therefore, that the power of the national government to prescribe appropriate procedures for meeting an emergency
created by a strike and cessation of production in an industry of critical national importance was not at issue. Neither did the case present
the question whether the private interest of the steel companies was
superior to the national interest in carrying out the defense program,
supporting the Korean undertaking, and meeting the commitments to
foreign countries. Nor was this a case of Court above the President
or Court above Congress. At issue was the problem of allocation of
authority within the federal government, and the Supreme Court
was faced with the task of umpire in defining the respective roles of
Congress and the President.36 The part played by the steel companies
was to raise the question as proper parties in interest.
In contrast to the arguments advanced orally by the Assistant Attorney General before Judge Pine,37 the Solicitor General's position in
the briefs and arguments before the Supreme Court was marked by
its moderation and restraint. Before Judge Pine the Assistant Attorney General had advanced the extraordinary and completely untenable
argument that the President of the United States possessed an inherent
executive prerogative not subject to review by the courts and subject
to judgment only in impeachment proceedings or at the polls.38 Before
36 A similar role is assumed by the Court in denning the respective areas of legislative
jurisdiction of Congress and the state legislatures under the Constitution. See note 2 supra.
Justice Holmes once observed that while he had doubts about judicial review of congressional legislation, it was clear to him that judicial review of state legislation was essential
to the working of the federal system. See HoLMEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-296
(1920 ed.). The same observation may be relevant with respect to the necessity of judicial
review of the President's acts.
37 See note 38 infra; also Judge Pine's opinion in 103 F. Supp. 569; Smith, "What
a Spanking He Gave Truman,'' SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Aug. 2, 1952, p. 27; N.Y.
TIMES, April 26, 1952.
38 The following excerpt of the exchange between Judge Pine and Assistant Attorney
General Holmes Baldridge, extracted from the official transcript, is reproduced in the Brief
for Respondents, pp. 27-28:
"The Court: So you contend the Executive has unlimited power in time of an
emergency'?
Mr. Baldridge: He has the power to take such action as is necessary to meet the
emergency.
The Court: I£ the emergency is great, it is unlimited, is it'?
Mr. Baldridge: I suppose if you carry it to its logical conclusion, that is true. But I
do want to point out that there are two limitations on the Executive power. One is the
ballot box and the other is impeachment.
The Court: Then, as I understand it, you claim that in time of emergency the
Executive has this great power.
Mr. Baldridge: That is correct.
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the Supreme Court it was conceded that the President derived his
powers from the Constitution, that he was subject to restraints imposed
by the Constitution,39 that his power to seize plants in a time of emergency could be controlled by affirmative action of Congress,40 that this
exercise of presidential power was open to judicial review,4 1 and that
the validity of the President's order in this case should be determined
not by reference to general and broad principles but solely by reference
to the facts relating to the critical character of the emergency.42 Broad
and sweeping generalizations about presidential authority were avoided.
Indeed, the Solicitor-General's brief consigned Judge Pine to the limbo
of outmoded jurists by its assertion that he had decided the case by
means of the "discredited judicial technique of constitutional interpretation, based on 'immutable principles' ...."43
The Court: And that the Executive determines the emergencies and the Courts cannot
even review whether it is an emergency.
Mr. Baldridge: That is correct."
"The Court: So, when -the sovereign people adopted the Constitution, it enumerated
the powers set up in the Constitution but linrited the powers of the Congress and linrited
the powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the Executive. Is that what
you say?
Mr. Baldridge: That is the way we read Article II of the Constitution."
"It is our position that the President is accountable only to the country, and that the
decisions of the President are conclusive."
It should be noted that following the argument before Judge Pine, President Truman
repudiated the extreme argument made on his behalf and disclaimed any authority to act
in disregard of the Constitution. See NEW YoRK T1MEs, April 28, 1952. Likewise the
brief filed with Judge Pine represented a more limited position than that asserted orally.
39 "We, of course, do not contend that the President has 'unlinrited and unrestrained'
power. We contend only that in a situation of national emergency the President has
authority under the Constitution, and subject to constitutional linritations, to take action of
this type necessary to meet the emergency." Brief for Petitioner, p. 50, footnote 39. See
also footnote 3, p. 103, emphasizing the argument that the President's action did not violate
any of the prohibitions contained in the first ten amendments.
40 The whole argument of the Solicitor General in Part III of Brief for Petitioner,
pp. 150-172, that the Labor-Management Relations Act did not preclude the President's
emergency action in this case, rests on the assumption that Congress could deny or disaffinn
the power claimed by the President.
41 On the remedial issue the Solicitor General did suggest "that the comts should
consider the inappropriateness of issuing what is in effect a mandatory injunction to the
President." Brief for Petitioner, p. 52. In support of this suggestion he cited Mississippi
v. Johnson, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 475 (1867), holding that the President could not be
restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional.
42 See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 91-102.
48 Id. at 101.
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III
Decision and Opinions in the Youngstown Case
We turn now to the decision in the case and the opinions rendered.
By a majority of six to three, the Supreme Court affirmed the granting
of the preliminary injunction by the district court. Justices Black,
Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton and Clark composed the majority. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Minton dissented.
Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court but separate opinions
were written by each of the other majority Justices. Justices Reed
and Minton concurred in the dissenting opinion written by the Chief
Justice.
Before turning to analysis of the opinions on the constitutional
question, note may be taken of the summary way in which the Court
disposed of the remedial issue. In developing the argument that rules
of equity jurisprudence did not warrant the issuance of the preliminary injunction,44 the Solicitor General had argued that the plaintiffs
had an adequate remedy at law since they could bring an action in
the Court of Claims to secure compensation for damages resulting
from the taking of their property, also that an invasion of the plaintiffs' property interest was more than balanced by the great public
interest in continuation of steel production. Even if Congress had
not authorized this seizure by the President, still the government
would be liable for damages on a taking theory, so ran the argument,
since Congress had authorized seizure under certain circumstances
and according to a certain procedure. Cases were cited to demonstrate the proposition that if a taking has been authorized by Congress,
then the government becomes liable for damages even if the officers
do not follow the prescribed procedure.45 Moreover, the Solicitor General contended that even if the President's seizure was completely
without authority, still the damage action would be adequate since the
Justice Department would agree not to contest the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims in such a case.46 The companies argued in turn that
the federal government could not be held liable in a compensation
proceeding before the Court of Claims for the taking of property by
federal officers unless Congress had expressly authorized the same,
citing Hooe 11. United States,47 that the cases sustaining a right of
44 Id. at 49-91.
45 Citing, inter alia,

Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 52 S.Ct. 267 (1932). Brief for
Petitioner, p. 56 et seq.
46 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 70-72.
47 218 U.S. 322, 31 S.Ct. 85 (1910).
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action for damages if some kind of taking was authorized were not
apposite since Congress had not authorized power to seize under these
circumstances, and that the Justice Department's undertaking that it
would not contest liability before the Court of Claims was no answer
since such a concession could not bind the government.48
Only Justices Black and Frankfurter made mention of the remedial
question in their opinions. The dissenting judges stated no objection
to the preliminary injunction on remedial grounds. Justice Black disposed of the issue in the following language:
"It is urged that there were non-constitutional grounds upon
which the District Court could have denied the preliminary injunction and thus have followed the customary judicial practice
of declining to reach and decide constitutional questions until
compelled to do so. On this basis it is argued that equity's extraordinary injunctive relief should have been denied because (a}
_seizure of the companies' properties did not inBict irreparable
damages, and (b) there were available legal remedies adequate
to afford compensation for any possible damages which they
might suffer. While separately argued by the Government these
two contentions are here closely related, if not identical. Arguments as to both rest in large part on the Government's claim
that should the seizure ultimately be held unlawful, the companies could recover full compensation in the Court of Claims
for the unlawful taking. Prior cases in this court have cast doubt
on the right to recover in the Court of Claims on account of properties unlawfully taken by government officials for public use as
these properties were alleged to have been. See e.g., Hooe 11.
United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335-336; United States 11. North
American Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333. But see Larson 11. Domestic
& Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-702. Moreover, seizure
and governmental operation of these going businesses were bound
to result in many . present and future damages of such
nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement. Viewing the case this way, and in the light of the facts presented, the
District Court saw no reason for delaying decision of the constitutional validity of the orders. We agree with the District Court
and can see no reason why that question was not ripe for determination on the record presented."49
Justice Frankfurter devoted a few words to the problem, stated
that the consequences of the seizure could not be reduced to dollars
48 Brief for Respondents, pp. 80-86.
49Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 at 584-585, 72 S.Ct.
863 (1952).
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and cents so as to make damages wholly compensable, and on the point
that the vital public interest in steel production outweighed the invasion of private interest, he made the following observation:
"One need not resort to a large epigrammatic generalization
that the evils of industrial dislocation are to be preferred to
allowing illegality to go unchecked. To deny inquiry into the
President's power in a case like this, because of the damage to the
public interest to be feared from upsetting its exercise by him,
would in effect always preclude inquiry into challenged power,
which presumably only avowed great public interest brings into
action. And so, with the utmost unwillingness, with every desire to avoid judicial inquiry into the powers and duties of the
other two branches of the government, I cannot escape consideration of the legality of Executive Order No. l 0340."50
Although Justice Douglas did not address himself specifically to the
remedial question, it is pertinent to note the statements in his opinion
that "until and unless Congress acted, no condemnation would be
lawful" and that the ''branch of government that has the power to pay
compensation for a seizure is the only one able to authorize a seizure
or make lawful one that the President had effected."51
In passing, it may be concluded that the absence of dissent on the
remedial issue, coupled with the brief treatment of the problem by
the majority indicate that the Court was unanimous in the opinion that
the damage remedy was inadequate if it were assumed that the President was acting without authority. 52 The case also makes clear that
50 Id. at 596. Note also the following language from Justice Frankfurter's opinion at
pp. 609-610: "The legislative history here canvassed is relevant to yet another of the issues
before us, namely, the Government's argument that overriding public interest prevents the
issuance of the injunction despite the illegality of the seizure. I cannot accept that contention. 'Balancing the Equities' when considering whether an injunction should issue, is
lawyers' jargon for choosing between conflicting public interests. When Congress itself has
struck the balance, has defined the weight to be given the competing interests, a court of
equity is not justified in ignoring that pronouncement under the guise of exercising equitable
discretion."
51 Id. at 631-632. In support of this conclusion he cited the following statement of
Justice Brandeis in United States v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330, 40 S.Ct. 518
(1920): "In order that the Government shall be liable it must appear that the officer who
has physically taken possession of the property was duly authorized to do so, either directly
by Congress or by the official upon whom Congress conferred the power."
Justice Douglas explained United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062
(1946), as a case where the acts of the officials resulting in a taking were authorized by
Congress, and also differentiated wartime seizures by the military in connection with military
operations as belonging in a different category. Footnote 2, p. 632.
52 This interpretation leaves open the question whether the conclusion that the legal
remedy was inadequate was based on complete lack of a damage remedy in the Court of
Claims, absent statutory authorization for the seizure, or on the difficulty in determining
monetary damages in such a case.
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the injunctive process of the federal courts may reach officers of the
President's Cabinet acting directly pursuant to authority granted by
the President.53
Before turning to the treatment of the meritorious question as reRected in the several opinions, it will be in order to examine somewhat
more closely the arguments advanced before the Court by the opposing
parties. In developing the argument that the President could properly
assert authority to seize the steel mills, subject to denial or disaffirmance
by Congress,54 the Solicitor General attached great importance at the
outset to the facts which narrowed the issue, namely, the critical importance of steel and the temporary character of the taking ordered
by the President. Turning to the language of Article II as the basis
of authority, the Solicitor General contended that the first clause of
section l constituted a grant of all the executive authority of which
the government is capable, referred to the President's authority as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and then concentrated the
major strength of his argument on the language of section 3, imposing
upon the President the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. In support of the presidential seizure of the steel mills as
a means of meeting the emergency situation, the Solicitor General
referred to historical instances of executive action, to instances of legislative recognition of executive prerogative, and to judicial decisions.
He pointed to executive seizures of private property through the whole
course of American history, beginning with the American Revolution,
through the War of 1812, and the Civil War, and down to the administrations of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The judicial
decisions cited included those briefly digested at the beginning of this
article, with extended emphasis upon the Civil War cases dealing with
the requisition and destruction of property for military purposes. Turning to the immediate problem on hand, the seizure of the steel mills
was seen to be a discharge of the President's duty to enforce the laws,
53 That Cabinet officers are not immune to the process of federal courts in the granting of extraordinary remedies had been established by earlier decisions. Kendall v. United
States, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 522 (1838) (mandamus against Postmaster General); Ickes v.
Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 57 S.Ct. 412 (1937) (injunction against Secretary of Interior). See also
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 67 S.Ct. 1009 (1947).
The decision in Mississippi v. Johnson, cited in note 41 supra, to the effect that an
injunction will not be issued directly against the President to restrain the enforcement of
an allegedly unconstitutional statute, is not disturbed by the principal case. Cf. Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 53 S.Ct. 190 (1932), sustaining an order enjoining the Governor of Texas from continuing a state of martial law over several oil-producing counties
where the facts showed no emergency to justify such an assertion of executive authority.
54 This part of the Solicitor General's argument appears in Brief for the Petitioner,
pp. 91-150.
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since Congress by its extensive system of laws providing for national
security had committed the nation to a full-scale and increasing national defense program in which the critical production of steel must
not be permitted to cease. This legislative program itself implied a
grant of power to the President, if not a mandate, to take the course
of action he found necessary to maintain steel production. Furthermore, Congress had done nothing to repudiate or countermand that
action. Nor did the Labor-Management Act preclude the President's
emergency action,55 since the President was not required to act under
this law, since this was not the exclusive procedure prescribed by Congress, since Congress had authorized the procedure under the Defense
Production Act with the power to refer the dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board for mediation, since the President by pursuing the alternative course of action had achieved substantially all that could have
been accomplished by using the Labor-Management Act procedure,
and since the act did not prohibit seizure by the President.
The companies in their brief opened the attack on the President's
action by pointing to the Labor-Management Act as prescribing the
procedure to be followed by the President in meeting such an emergency, a statutory procedure which precluded resort to executive
seizure.56 The President by failing to invoke the statutory procedure
could not thereby create for himself a right to create new emergency
procedures. The President's action posed a square conflict between
the word of Congress and the will of the Executive. 57 In so far as
the President's authority was based on a claim of non-reviewable
"inherent power," it must be rejected. Similar notions at one time
advanced by the English Crown had culminated in the developments
which made clear that the Crown was under the law and that the
seizure of property by the Crown without authority of Parliament was
illegal. Article II of the Constitution furnishes no authority for the
President's action.58 It nowhere confides in the Executive any express
power to take such undefined action as he deems best for the public
interest, either in an emergency or otherwise. The seizure, far from
being an exercise of the power and responsibility to execute the laws,
was itself in conflict with the laws of Congress which had refused to
authorize the use of seizure in the type of situation here presented.59
55 This

argument is developed in Brief for Petitioner, pp. 150-172.
pp. 18-26.

56 Brief for Respondents,
57 Id. at 27-37.

58 Id. at
59 Id.

37-43.

at 43-52.
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Nor could the seizure be justified under the President's power as
Commander in Chief, since this clause confers upon the President
the limited function of direction- of military operations.60 Laws relating
to the conduct of war and the maintenance of our defenses are within
the sole domain of Congress. The President under his military authority has the power to control civilian activity only where the emergency is so imminent and the threat of military danger to the nation
so pressing that the slightest delay would lead to disaster. But apart
from this extreme military situation, power of eminent domain is
a legislative power to be exercised under statutory authqrization.
Precedents derived from past instances of exercise of presidential
prerogative of doubtful validity cannot by "some legerdemain serve as
authority to legalize present illegality."61 Seizure of property without
authority is a deprivation of property without due process of law
contrary to the Fifth Amendment, and even if the President had some
authority to seize property without statutory authorization, still the
exercise of that power in this case was so drastic and arbitrary as to
violate the due process requirement. 62
Turning now to the treatment in the several opinions of the
meritorious questions, the picture becomes more complicated, for lack
of unanimity within the Court was manifest not only by the dissent of
three of the judges but also by differences in view on the part of the
majority.

Justice Black. We turn £.rst to the short and concise opinion of
Justice Black who delivered the opinion of the Court. 63 After pointing
out that the seizure of the steel mills by the President was not only
unauthorized by the Taft-Hartley Labor-Management Act but that
Congress had refused to adopt this method of settling labor disputes
when it had rejected an amendment to the act embodying such a proposal, he then turned to the argument that the President derived this
power from the Constitution. He rejected the argument based on the
President's position as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and
dismissed as irrelevant the cases upholding broad powers of military
commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war.
"Even though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept, we
cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that
60 Id. at 52-61.
61 Id. at 62-67.
62 Id. at 67-69.
63 343 U.S. 579

at 582-589, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952). The arguments of both Justices
Black and Douglas were substantially the same as those stated by Judge Pine of the district
court. See note 30 supra.
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the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate
power as such to take possession of private property in order to
keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for
the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities."
Nor could the seizure be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions granting executive power to the President, i.e., the
vesting of executive power in the President under section 1 of Article
II and that provision of section 3 of Article II directing the President
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Here Justice Black
expressed himself most forcibly. The President's power to execute
the laws refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution
limits the President's functions in the law-making process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he
thinks bad. The Constitution makes clear in Article I that Congress
has all the legislative power therein granted. Here the President's
order did not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner
prescribed by Congress but instead directed that a presidential policy be
executed in a manner prescribed by the President. Thus Justice Black
disposed of the case by invoking the elementary principle of separation
of powers under the Constitution.
Justice Douglas. In his separate opinion64 Justice Douglas expressed concurrence in the separation-of-powers argument relied upon
by Justice Black. Several points developed by him in further elaboration of the argument are worth noting. Pointing out that the solution
to the crucial problems of labor and industry might take several paths
including the enactment of laws and that laws entail sanctions,
whether fine and imprisonment or seizure of property, he observed
that a "determination that sanctions should be applied, that the hand
of the law should be placed upon the parties, and that the force of the
courts should be directed against them, is an exercise of legislative
power." This legislative power is confided to Congress under the
Constitution. Moreover, the taking of property, represented by the
seizure of a plant, is an exercise of eminent domain powers for which
compensation is required, but only Congress which alone has the
power to authorize appropriations to pay for a taking has the power to
authorize a taking.
64

Id. at 629-634.
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Justice Frankfurter. Although he wrote an extended concurring
opinion,65 Justice Frankfurter noted his concurrence in Justice Black's
opinion because he thoroughly agreed on the application of the
separation-of-powers principle to the circumstances of this case, even
though he thought that the considerations relevant to the enforcement
of this principle seemed more complicated and flexible than appeared
from what Justice Black had written. 66 In his separate opinion he
limited his discussion more narrowly to the precise issue before the
Court without attempting to state generalizations on the scope of
presidential power. More particularly, he emphasized that it was
irrelevant to consider what powers the President would have had if
there had been no legislation whatever bearing on the problem of
seizure, or if the seizure had been only for a short, explicitly stated
temporary period, to be determined automatically unless congressional
approval were given. Justice Frankfurter then went on to discuss
the history of congressional policy respecting executive seizure of
production, transportation, . communication, and storage facilities,
pointed out that when Congress had vested the President with the
extraordinary seizure power, it had deemed it so drastic a power as to
require that it be carefully circumscribed, and referred to the legislative
history of the Labor-Management Act of 1947 to support the conclusion
that Congress was not only very familiar with government seizure as a
protective measure but that Congress on a balance of considerations had
chosen not to lodge this power in the President. "In any event, nothing
can be plainer than that Congress made a conscious choice of policy
in· a field full of perplexity and peculiarly within legislative responsibility for choice." It could not be contended that the President would
have had power to issue this order.if Congress had explicitly negated
·such authority in formal legislation, and in the Justice's opinion
Congress had expressed its will to withhold this power from the President as though it had said so in so many words. The fact that power
exists in the government to order seizure does not vest it in the President, and the need for new legislation does not serve to enact a law
giving the President this power, nor does it repeal or amend existing
laws. Nor did the legislative history of the Defense Production Act
of 1950 afford ground for the suggestion that the 1947 denial of
seizure powers to the President had been impliedly repealed. To find
65 Id. at 593-614. Appended to his opinion were Appendices I and II, consisting of
charts listing statutes authorizing seizure of industrial property and listing instances of
presidential seizure of such property.
66 Id. at 589.
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seizure authority in the President when it had been so explicitly withheld was not merely to disregard in a particular instance the clear will
of Congress but to disrespect the whole legislative process and the
constitutional division of authority between President and Congress.
Turning to the argument based on the President's duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, Justice Frankfurter stated
that the nature of this authority had been comprehensively indicated
by Justice Holmes in his dissent in the Myers case: 67 "The duty of the
President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go
beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees
fit to leave within his power." The Justice admitted that a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, could be treated as an authoritative gloss on "executive Power," citing United States v. Midwest
Oil Co.,68 involving the long continued executive practice of withdrawing certain public lands from private entry, but no remotely comparable practice could be vouched for executive seizure of property
at a time when this country was not at war, in the only constitutional
way in which it could be at war. Pointing out that most seizures
during World War I and II were pursuant to statutory authority,
Justice Frankfurter stated that the three isolated instances of presidential seizure without a declared state of war, in the six month period
from June to December of 1941, did not add up, either in number,
scope, duration or contemporaneous legal justification, to the kind of
executive construction of the Constitution revealed in the Midwest Oil
case. "Nor do they come to us sanctioned by long-continued acquiescence of Congress giving decisive weight to a construction by the
Executive of its powers."
Justice Jackson. An extensive concurring opinion69 was written by
Justice Jackson. He began his analysis of presidential power by
positing three types of situations: (I) when the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at
its maximum for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate; (2) when the President acts in absence
of either congressional grant or denial of authority, he can rely only
upon his own independent powers, but there is a twilight zone in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain; (3) when the President takes measures
67Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 at 177, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926).

68236 U.S. 459, 35 S.Ct. 309 (1915).
343 U.S. 579 at 634-655, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952).

69

166

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power
is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter, and in such a case the courts can sustain exclusive presidential
control only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.
A presidential claim of authority in this third category must be scrutinized with caution, "for what is at stake is the equilibrium established
by our constitutional system." Into which of these three categories
did the seizure of the steel mills fit? Clearly not in the first category,
since it was conceded that no congressional authority existed for this
seizure. Nor could it be defended under the flexible tests available
to the second category since Congress had not left seizure of private
property an open field but had covered it by three statutory policies
inconsistent with this seizure, namely, the policies and procedures
expressed in the Selective Service Act of 1948, the Defense Production
Act of 1950, and the Labor-Management Act of 1947. Accordingly
the current seizure could be justified only as a presidential act fitting
into the third group where it could be supported only by the assertion
of executive power after subtraction of such powers as Congress had
over the subject. "In short, we can sustain the President only by
holding that seizure of such strike-bound industries is within his
domain and beyond control by Congress."70
Having established this premise,71 Justice Jackson turned to an
analysis of the arguments made by the Solicitor-General based on the
language of Article II of the Constitution, after observing that in his
opinion the executive branch, like the federal government as a whole,
possesses only delegated powers,72 although he was ready to accord the
President's enumerated powers "the scope and elasticity afforded by
what seem to be reasonable practical implications instead of the
rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism." The first argument of the
Solicitor-General based on section l of Article II, vesting the executive
power in the President, made little impression on Justice Jackson.
10 Id.

at 640.
follows in Justice Jackson's opinion is in the nature of a gratuitous discussion,
although an interesting and valuable one, since the Solicitor General had not contended
that the presidential action could be upheld if incompatible with the will and intent of
Congress and since the dissenting opinion recognized the power of Congress to control
the President's action by denying or disaffirming the seizure power.
72 343 U.S. 579 at 640, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952). In taking this position Justice Jackson
apparently rejects the "inherent power" theory enunciated in United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216 (1936). In his discussion of this case
in note 2, pp. 635-636, he points out that the result in this case could be adequately sustained on a theory of delegation of power by Congress to the President. See note 12 supra.
71 What
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The Solicitor-General had argued that this clause "constitutes a grant
of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable."
The Justice made short shrift of this contention. If it were true that
this clause granted all the executive powers of which the government
was capable, it was difficult to see why the forefathers bothered
to add several specific items, including some trifling ones. "I cannot
accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable
executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office
of the generic powers thereafter stated."73 Attention was then given
to the argument based on the President's status as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy. The Solicitor-General had argued
that since the President had sent troops to Korea, he had thereby
created a power to seize the means of producing a supply of steel for
them. In comment on this argument, Justice Jackson, after noting
that only Congress can declare war, even though a state of war may
exist without a formal declaration, made the pungent observation:
"But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me
more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of
foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown,
can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country
by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign
venture."74 It was unnecessary, however, to consider the legal status
of the Korean enterprise, since assuming that we are in a war de facto,
whether it is or is not a war de jure, the President is not empowered
to seize industries he thinks necessary to supply the army. The Constitution reposes in Congress the power to raise and support Armies
and to provide and maintain a Navy. The Constitution in making
the President the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy did
not constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its
industries and its inhabitants. The President has no monopoly of
"war powers." Congress cannot deprive the President of the command
of the army and navy, but only Congress can provide him an army
or navy to command. The military powers of the Commander in
Chief were not to supersede representative government of internal
affairs. The express provision of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions, "written at a time
when the militia rather than a standing army was contemplated as the
73
74

Id. at 641.
Id. at 642.
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military weapon of the Republic, underscores the Constitution's policy
that Congress, not the Executive, should control utilization of the war
power as an instrument of domestic policy." 75 Although Justice
Jackson would indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain
the President's exclusive function to command the instruments of
national force, at least when turned against the outside world for the
security of our society, when it is turned inward, not because of
rebellion but because of a lawful economic _struggle between industry
and labor, it shoulq have no such indulgence.
"No penance would ever expiate the sin against free government of holding that a President can escape control of executive
powers by law through assuming his military role. What the
power of command may include I do not try to envision, but I
think it is not a military prerogative, without support of law, to
seize persons or property because they are important or even
essential for the military and naval establishment."76
Turning to the argument based on the clause of Article II that the
President shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, Justice
Jackson stated that this language was matched by the Fifth Amendment's clause, "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." The one clause gives a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law, the other gives a
private right that authority shall go no farther. "These signify about
all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of
men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules." 77
Finally, Justice Jackson examined the Solicitor General's argument
based upon nebulous, inherent powers never expressly granted but
said to have accrued to the office from the customs and claims of
preceding administrations. "The plea is for a resulting power to deal
with a crisis or an emergency according to the necessities of the case,
the unarticulated assumption being that necessity knows no law." 78
After referring to what he called loose and irresponsible use of adjectives
coloring "all non-legal and much legal discussion of presidential
powers," sueh as "·mh erent" powers, "·1mp1·1ed" powers, "·mc1·dental"
powers, "l
p enary" powers, "war" powers and"emergency" powers,
and observing that the claim of inherent and unrestricted presidential
powers has long been a persuasive dialectical weapon in political con75 Id. at 644.
76 Id. at 646.
77Jbid.
1s Ibid.
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troversy, but that prudence had counseled that actual reliance on such
nebulous claims should stop short of provoking a judicial test, the
Justice examined the Solicitor General's argument that the practice of
prior Presidents had authorized seizures in a case like this.79 Justice
Jackson's answer was that the Constitution made no provision for
exercise of extraordinary authority by the executive because of a
crisis. Even the wartime emergency powers of the executive in Great
Britain and France had been created by legislative measures. This
contemporary foreign experience suggests that emergency powers are
consistent with free government only when their control is lodged
elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them. This is the
safeguard that would be nullified by adoption of the "inherent powers"
formula. Congress may and has granted extraordinary authority to the
executive to meet emergencies, and under this procedure we retain
government by law. In view of the ease, expedition and safety with
which Congress can grant large emergency powers, ample to embrace
crises like the one involved in the steel seizure, the argument that
such powers should be affirmed without statute is unimpressive. "I
cannot be brought to believe that this country will suffer if the Court
refuses further to aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent
and so relatively immune from judicial review, at the expense of
Congress."80

Justice Burton. After stating his concurrence in Justice Black's
opinion, Justice Burton added a short separate opinion,81 in which
he emphasized that neither the procedure authorized by Congress
under the Taft-Hartley Act or the alternative procedure, also authorized
by Congress, whereby the President had referred the labor controversy
in the steel case to the Wage Stabilization Board, carried statutory
authority for the seizure of private industries in the manner now at
issue. Congress had reserved the matter of seizure for its own consideration. The President's order therefore invaded the jurisdiction of
Congress. These circumstances distinguished this emergency from one
in which Congress took no action and outlined no governmental policy.
70 The Solicitor General had placed major reliance on President Roosevelt's seizure of
the strike-bound North American Aviation Company's plant on June 9, 1941. Mr. Jackson
was Attorney General and had given an opinion sustaining the President's action. In dealing with this executive precedent, Justice Jackson pointed out what he regarded as decisive
factors distinguishing that case a~d then went on to say that even if he were to regard it
as a precedent for the steel seizure, "I should not bind present judicial judgment by earlier
partisan advocacy." Principal case at 649, footnote 17.
80 Id. at 654.
81 Id. at 655-660.
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Moreover, the President had no inherent constitutional power, apart
from congressional action, to seize property under the present circumstances.
"The present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or threatened attack. We do not face the issue of
what might be the President's constitutional power to meet such
catastrophic situations. Nor is it claimed that the current seizure
is in the nature of a military command addressed by the President,
as Commander in Chief, to a mobilized nation waging, or imminently threatened with, total war."82
Justice Clark. In his separate concurring opinion,83 Justice Clark
started with the proposition that the Constitution does grant to the
President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national
emergency. "In fact, to my thinking, such a grant may well be necessary to the very existence of the Constitution itself."84 But the President's independent power to act, depending upon the gravity of the
situation confronting the nation, may be exercised only in the absence
of action of Congress defining the procedure to be followed in meeting ·
the crisis. Where Congress had laid down specific procedures to deal
with the type of crisis confronting the nation, the President must follow
those procedures. 85 The seizure in the instant case could not be sustained because Congress had prescribed the methods to be followed
by the President. Three statutory procedures were available: those
provided in the Defense Production Act, the Labor-l\1anagement Relations Act and the Selective Service Act of 1948. The President.had
elected to proceed under the Defense Production Act which gave the
President no power to seize an industry and which created no sanctions
for the settlement of labor disputes.
Chief Justice Vinson. The dissenting opinion86 of the Chief Justice,
concurred in by Justices Reed and Minton must now be considered.
The initial part of the dissenting opinion, which on the whole
adopted the Solicitor General's contentions, was devoted to a recital
of facts showing that these are extraordinary times and that a world
not yet recovered from the devastation of World War II has been forced
82 Id. at 659.
83 Id. at 660-667.
84 Id. at 662.
85 Justice Clark placed

great reliance on Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (6 U.S.)
(1804), holding invalid a seizure under presidential order of a vessel bound from a French
port where Congress had given a specific authority to seize vessels bound or sailing to a
French port. See his discussion of this case at 343 U.S. 660-661.
86 343 U.S. 579 at 667-710.
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to face the threat of another and more terrifying global conflict.
Reference was made to the country's support of the United Nation's
effort to repel aggression in Korea, a program Congress had supported
by provisions for increased military manpower and equipment and for
economic stabilization, to congressional enactments of the T roman
Plan for assistance to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan for
economic aid to build up the strength of our friends in Europe, to
ratification by the Senate of the North Atlantic Treaty and the legislation by Congress implementing the same by authorizing military assistance to nations dedicated to the principles of mutual security under the
United Nations Charter, and to the enactment of the Mutual Security
Act of 1951. These represent enormous undertakings. Moreover, Congress had directed the President to build up our own defenses. The
impact of these defense programs upon the economy was recognized
by Congress. Under the Defense Production Act of 1950 Congress
granted the power to requisition property and to allocate and fix
priorities for scarce goods; also, in this same statute it granted power to
stabilize prices and wages and to provide for settlement of labor disputes
arising in the defense program. The President had the duty to execute
these legislative programs. Their successful execution depended upon
continued production of steel and stabilized prices for steel. Accordingly the President acted to prevent a complete shutdown of steel
production when he certified the steel dispute to the Wage Stabilization
Board which submitted recommendations which were acceptable to the
Union but rejected by the companies. \iVhen the Union gave notice
of intention to strike, the President issued his Executive Order directing
seizure of the steel mills by the Secretary of Commerce. The President
immediately sent a special message to Congress reporting his action,
leaving the way open for Congress to follow some other course in dealing with the crisis. The President twelve days later in a letter to the
President of the Senate again stated that Congress if it wished could
reject the course of action he had followed. But Congress took no
such action.
Against the background of these facts, the dissent considered the
question whether the President has any power under the Constitution
to meet a critical situation in the absence of express statutory auhorization. It was recognized that the steel mills were seized for a public
use and that compensation was required to be paid under the Fifth
Amendment. Judge Pine had accepted the companies' argument that
the power of eminent domain could not be exercised by the President
unless he could point to an express provision in enabling legislation.

172

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

In passing on this question the dissent proceeded to examine the
general question of presidential authority under the Constitution.
Under section 1 of Article II the whole of the "executive Power" is
vested in the President. The presidency was deliberately fashioned as
an office of power and independence. The dissent then reviewed
at length87 instances of executive leadership when Presidents discharging their obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,
whether with or without explicit statutory authorization, dealt with
national emergencies by acting promptly and resolutely to enforce
legislative programs, at least to save those programs until Congress could
act. Reference was made to actions taken by a series of Presidents,
from Washington to Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the action of President
T rurnan in employing the nation's forces to meet aggression in Korea.
United States v. Russell,88 In re Neagle, 89 In re Dehs,90 Myers v.
United States91 and United States v. Midwest Oil Company,92 were
cited as judicial precedents to lend judicial support to the claims of
executive power as historically asserted.
This part of the dissenting opinion ended with the following
paragraphs:
"This is but a cursory summary of executive leadership. But
it amply demonstrates that Presidents have taken prompt action
to enforce the laws and protect the country whether or not Congress happened to provide in advance for the particular method
of execution. At the minimum, the executive actions reviewed
herein sustain the action of the President in this case. And many
of the cited examples of Presidential practice go far beyond the
extent of power necessary to sustain the President's order to seize
the steel mills. The fact that temporary executive seizures of
industrial plants to meet an emergency have not been directly
tested in this Court furnishes not the slightest suggestion that
such actions have been illegal. Rather, the fact that Congress
and the courts have consistently recognized and given their
support to such executive action indicates that such a power of
seizure has been accepted throughout our history." 93
Corning to the situation confronting the President on the night
of April 8, 1952, the dissenters felt forced to conclude that the
87Jd. at 683-700.
Wall. (80 U.S.) 623 (1872).
89 135 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 658 (1890).
90 158 U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900 (1895).
91272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926).
92 236 U.S. 459, 35 S.Ct. 309 (1915).
93 343 U.S. 579 at 700.
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President was performing his duty under the Constitution to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed-here the laws relating to
procurement of military equipment and the accompanying price stabilization program. In doing this the President was not acting solely
on the basis of his own notions of the public welfare. Nor was this
a case raising a question of unlimited executive power, since the
President had invited Congress if it chose to prescribe a different
course of action. Absence of a specific statute authorizing seizure of the
steel mills as a mode of executing the laws enacted by Congress was
immaterial since the President was a constitutional officer charged
with taking care that a "mass of legislation" be executed and since
flexibility as to mode of execution to meet critical situations was a
matter of practical necessity. No statute prohibited seizure as a method
of enforcing legislative programs. Congress had not in any way
indicated that its legislation was not to be executed by the taking of
private property if its legislation could not otherwise be executed.
Indeed, the authorizations of seizure under the Defense Production
Act in instances not necessarily crucial to the defense program could
hardly be said to have disclosed an intention to prohibit seizures where
essential to the execution of that legislative program. 'Whatever the
extent of Presidential power on more tranquil occasions, and whatever
the right of the President to execute legislative programs as he sees
fit without reporting the mode of execution to Congress, the single
Presidential purpose disclosed on this record is to faithfully execute
the laws by acting in an emergency to maintain the status quo, thereby
preventing collapse of the legislative programs until Congress could
ac.t 1194
According to the dissent the Taft-Hartley Act did not preclude the
President's action. Its emergency procedure provisions are not mandatory. The legislative creation of the new procedure under the Defense
Production Act of 1950 for dealing with defense disputes negatived
any notion that Congress intended the earlier and discretionary TaftHartley procedure to be an exclusive procedure. Taft-Hartley was a
route parallel to, not connected with, the Wage Stabilization Board
procedure. Before the President issued his seizure order, he had
exhausted the procedures for settlement available to him.
This statement of the dissenting opinion is concluded with the
following paragraph taken from the last part of the opinion:
94 Id.

at 703.
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"The diversity of views expressed in the six opinions of the
majority, the lack of reference to authoritative precedent, the
repeated reliance upon prior dissenting opinions, the complete
disregard of the uncontroverted facts showing the gravity of the
emergency and the temporary nature of the taking all serve to
demonstrate how far afield one must go to affirm the order of the
District Court."95

IV
Conclusions

The various opinions have been examined in some detail both in
order to give some indication of the range of the discussions and to
indicate important differences of opinion not only between the majority and dissenting groups on the Court but also within the group
constituting the majority. It also suggests some hazards involved
in attempting to reduce the opinions to some general conclusions.
At the outset one may note some areas of general agreement within
the Court in the disposition of the case. First of all, as previously
pointed out, it is clear that all of the judges conceded that the President's action was subject to judicial review, that the President was
subject to constitutional limitations, and that the federal courts have
authority to enjoin an executive agent of the President from carrying
out an illegal order. Indeed, the reviewability of the President's order
becomes particularly clear from the dissenting opinion which assumed
a judicial authority to review the facts to determine whether an emergency existed.
Respecting the validity of the President's action, the various
opinions show some areas of agreement. All agreed that Congress
could properly authorize the President to seize industrial plants as
part of a legislative program designed to deal with situations of this
kind. All agreed that such a seizure when authorized is a taking of
property for public use in exercise of the power of eminent domain.96
All agreed further that Congress by virtue of its legislative powers
has the paramount authority to prescribe procedures and programs to
95 Id. at 708.
96 This had been

authoritatively established in United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341
U.S. 114, 71 S.Ct. 670 (1951), a case arising from presidential seizure of coal mines in
1943. The only question before the Court of Claims and, on review, before the Supreme
Court in this case was whether the President's seizure was a taking of property within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment and what the measure of damages should be. The legality of the President's seizure was not at issue.
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be followed in meeting an emergency situation of this kind; whatever
authority the President may have by virtue of his office is subject
to legislative limitation. The dissenting judges, it should be emphasized, did not assert the supremacy of executive prerogative over congressional legislative authority.97 It is fair to conclude also that all
the Court agreed that the President's action could not be justified as
an exercise of his military power as Commander in Chief of the armed
forces. 98 Indeed, the case should serve as a particularly valuable precedent in precluding an extensive interpretation of the President's
autonomous military powers as a basis for executive control of the
internal economy when the country is not in a state of declared war
and not threatened with imminent invasion.99 Finally, the case shows
a common area of agreement in that the interpretations placed upon
the President's powers are based on the language of the Constitution,
a common willingness to accept the premise that the President's powers
are delegated powers and that the President's actions must be justified
on the basis of the grants of authority under Article II.100 The theory
of inherent power in the conduct of foreign affairs, advanced in the
Curtiss-Wright case101 £nds no echo in these opinions dealing with
presidential powers respecting internal matters.102 In the end, the
members of the Court seem pretty well agreed that whatever con97 As pointed out in note 71 supra, the proposition refuted at length in Justice Jackson's opinion that the President has an emergency power that warrants a course of executive
action incompatible with the will and purpose of Congress was not advanced by the Solicitor General before the Supreme Court and was not asserted by the dissenting Justices.
98 Although an occasional reference appears in the dissenting opinion to the President's
status as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, the central theme of the dissent was
that the President had exercised his duty and power to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
99 Likewise, the lack of references to the President's extensive power in the field of
foreign affairs should serve to refute any notion that the executive prerogative in this area
furnishes a basis for asserting an authority over the domestic economy because of its important relation to foreign policy and commitments.
100 The case leaves unsettled the question whether the first sentence of section 1 of
Article II of the Constitution, vesting the executive power in the President, is in itself a
grant of power or merely a designation of the title of the clrlef executive. Justice Jackson
clearly indicated that he accepts the latter interpretation. The opinions by Justice Black
and Chief Justice Vinson suggest a merger of this language with the clause found in
section 3 in regard to the duty to enforce the laws.
101 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216 (1936).
102 Perhaps an uncertain exception should be noted in respect to Justice Clark who,
after conceding that the Constitution grants to the President extensive authority in times of
grave and imperative national emergency, subject to the procedures prescribed by Congress,
went on to say: "In describing this authority, I care not whether one calls it 'residual,'
'inherent,' 'moral,' 'implied,' 'aggregate,' 'emergency,' or otherwise." 343 U.S. 579 at 662.
Justice Jackson made clear that in his opinion all powers of the President are delegated
powers and also indicated that he was not in accord with some of the language used in the
Curtiss-Wright case. See note 72 supra.
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stitutional power the President has to take action in a non-military
situation, apart from specific authorization by Congress, must rest on
the general power stated in section 3 of Article II that the President
''shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
We turn now to the areas of disagreement. Starting from a common
premise of the legislative supremacy of Congress in defining policies
for dealing with labor disputes in industries of critical importance,
three principal patterns of thought emerge from the opinions. Justices
Black and Douglas rest their conclusion on the proposition that the
taking of property must rest on statutory authorization and that therefore the President's action of seizure could not be justified unless
Congress by affirmative legislation had authorized or ratified the
same. In their thinking the President derives no power of a legislative
character from his authority to enforce the laws and therefore he has
no authority to initiate such measures unaided by legislative act. The
power to attend to the faithful execution of the laws does not embrace
a power to prescribe penalties or sanctions. This is the province of
Congress. In short the constitutional grant of the enforcement power
implies no fund of subordinate legislative power. This position
postulates a clear and unequivocal distinction between executive power,
on the one hand, and legislative power, on the other.
Justice Frankfurter without committing himself to the question
whether the President under Article II derives powers concurrent with
but subordinate to the legislative powers of Congress, rested his conclusion on the ground that Congress had made clear its rejection
of plant-seizure as an instrument of national policy in dealing with
labor disputes and that this was a sufficient basis for negativing the
claim of executive authority as here asserted. Justice Jackson, while
devoting the major part of his opinion to the thesis that the President
has no emergency power that he may assert in contradiction to the
will of Congress, apparently concedes an area where executive authority
and legislative powers overlap and where the President may act in a
manner not inconsistent with legislative policy.103 Justice Burton
rests his case primarily on the ground that legislative action in this
103 "When the President acts in absence of either congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twi·
light in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution
is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at
least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." 343
U.S. 579 at 637.
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instance precluded the President's seizure order and does not commit
himself on the scope of presidential power when Congress has not
acted to occupy the field.104 Justice Clark's position was less equivocal.
He accepts the proposition that the President has the power derived
from the Constitution to deal with emergencies, subject to the paramount legislative authority of Congress, but found that in this case
Congress had prescribed procedures to be followed and had thereby
negatived any authority of the President to use plant seizure as a
method of carrying out his functions.
The dissenting opinion rests squarely on the proposition that the
President because of his power and duty to enforce the laws, has an
autonomous authority under the Constitution to choose the appropriate
means in time of emergency to implement the legislative programs
of Congress and that while this authority is subject to the paramount
legislative power of Congress, it is not negated unless Congress has
acted affirmatively either to deny the specific power asserted or to
disaffirm the same.
This then completes the picture: two of the judges105 find no
power in the President to seize plants in time of emergency unless
expressly authorized; three of the judges106 find power in the President
to take such action unless such power is expressly prohibited or disaffirmed by the Congress; one judge107 affirms the power of the President
to deal with emergencies but finds it negatived because Congress has
specifically prescribed procedures which excluded the President's
action; and three judges108 without committing themselves on whether
the President has some concurrent but subordinate seizure power,
parallel to the legislative powers of Congress to deal with emergencies,
rest their case on the preclusion of the President's action because of
the policies asserted and procedures prescribed by Congress. To put
104 Although the second paragraph of Justice Burton's opinion at p. 659 of 343 U.S.
579, suggests that in his opinion the President has no power of initiative to seize property
during a non-military emergency, the dominant emphasis in his opinion on the incompatibility of the President's seizure order with the legislation enacted by Congress supports
the conclusion expressed in the text above that he did not squarely commit himself on the
question of presidential power to meet an emergency situation in the absence of legislation.
105 Justices Black and Douglas.
106 Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Minton.
107 Justice Clark.
10s Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton. Although Justice Jackson does recognize
that there are twilight zones in which Congress and the President have concurrent powers
(see note 103 supra), his footnote reference at that point in his opinion to cases involving
authority to deal with military situations indicates that he did not commit himself on the
question whether the President has some subordinate concurrent power to take the initiative
in meeting a non-military emergency by ordering seizure of industrial property. On Justice
Burton's position, see note 104 supra.
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the matter more comprehensively two members1° 9 of the Court deny
to the President a concurrent power derived from the Constitution
to take measures of an essentially legislative character in time of
emergency, four members recognize such a concurrent power subordinate to the power of Congress,110 and three members are uncommitted on whether the President has any such concurrent power.111
To state the results in still another way, two of the judges1 12 deny
to the President the power to take emergency measures that Congress
has authority to prescribe unless Congress has granted this authority;
three of the judges1 13 grant such power to the President unless the
Congress has expressly denied or disaffirmed such authority by
affirmative legislation; four of the judges1 14 deny such power to the
President if found to be inconsistent with the policies and procedures
formulated by Congress even though there has been p.o categorical
denial or disaffirmance by Congress of the specific course followed
by the President. This analysis points to the conclusion that as long
as the Court retains its present personnel, the way may be open for
valid presidential action to meet an internal emergency without express
congressional authorization provided such action is not seen to be in
conflict with the intent and policy of Congress.
Before completing the study of the opinions, it is pertinent to
examine the · strong statement expressed in the dissenting opinion
that the majority had gone far afield in affirming the order of the
district court. Specifically, the majority were chided for not referring
to authoritative precedent, for repeatedly relying upon prior dissenting
opinions, and for completely disregarding the facts showing the
gravity of the emergency and the temporary nature of the taking. The
charge that the majority disregarded the crucial _facts respecting the
emergency and the nature of the order is hardly well founded. The
majority opinions made clear that the national government had adequate powers to deal with emergency situations of vital concern to the
national safety and welfare. The fact that an emergency existed did
not eliminate for the majority the questions relating to the respective
roles of Congress and the President under the Constitution.
109 Justices Black
110 Chief Justice

and Douglas.
Vinson and Justices Reed, Minton and Clark. Justice Clark is included in this group in view of the strong statement in his opinion, although it must be
recognized that this statement was gratuitous since he found the President's seizure order
invalid because it was inconsistent with the action of Congress.
111 Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton. See note 108 supra.
112 Justices Black and Douglas.
113 Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Minton.
114 Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton and Clark.
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Turning to the complaint registered in the dissenting op1mon
that the majority referred to no authoritative precedent and that the
majority opinions repeatedly relied upon prior dissenting opinions, it
is of course true that the majority could cite no case directly in point
to serve as precedent for invalidating the President's action here. It
is true also that references were made to views expressed by Justices
Holmes115 and Brandeis116 in their dissents in the famous Myers
case.117 But this is a common practice and hardly serves to support
the implication that the dissenting opinion in the principal case was
supported by authoritative precedent. Indeed, if one general criticism
may be made of the dissenting opinion, it is that precedents furnished
both by prior presidential acts ranging over the whole territory of
American history,1 18 and by judicial decisions dealing with distinctive
factual situations are indiscriminately lumped together to help support
the dissenters' view of executive authority. The prior self-serving
assertions of presidential power, whether by word or deed, can hardly
serve as adequate authority for defining the President's constitutional
position. As Justice Black pointed out, the executive cannot by its
own acts displace the power of Congress. Moreover, a number of
these presidential acts, such as President Lincoln's,119 related to military
problems growing out of the Civil War and were irrelevant in the
context of the problem before the Court. Likewise the cases cited in
the dissenting opinion, cases briefly summarized earlier in the article,
dealt with situations and problems quite remote from the problem
raised by seizure of the steel mills. It requires considerable elasticity
of interpretation to say that the dissenting opinion was required by
adherence to authoritative sources and precedents.
115 See
116 See

Justice Frankfurter's opinion, 343 U.S. 579 at 610.
Justice Douglas' opinion, id. at 629 and Justice Frankfurter's opinion, id. at

613.
111 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926).
118 Reference was made, inter alia, to President Jefferson's initiative

in the Louisiana
Purchase. 343 U.S. 579 at 685. But the President's power to negotiate a treaty is recognized under the Constitution. In the case of the Louisiana Purchase, the Senate ratified
the treaty negotiated by President Jefferson, and Congress by legislative act authorized
occupation by the President of the Louisiana territory and appropriated money for its purchase. See the references to this action in Brief for the Respondents, pp. 64-65 and in
Justice Jackson's opinion, 343 U.S. 579 at 638, footnote 5.
See note 119 infra for the dissenting opinion's reference to President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation.
119 The dissenting opinion states that President Lincoln's "most striking action" was
the Emancipation Proclamation, issued in aid of the successful prosecution of the Civil
War, but wholly without statutory authority. 343 U.S. 579 at 685. But the Proclamation
was distinctively a war measure and operated only to free slaves held as enemy property
in Confederate Territory. It remained for the Thirteenth Amendment to effect a universal
emancipation throughout the United States.
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To the writer it appears that the position taken by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton and Clark that the President's action could
not stand in the face of the policies and procedures prescribed by Congress in the exercise of its paramount legislative power was an adequate
and sound ground for disposition of the case. The position of the
dissent that nothing in the legislation of Congress precluded the
President's action fails to convince in view of the persuasive interpretation of congressional policy indicated in Justice Frankfurter's
opinion.
The position asserted by Justices Black and Douglas that in no
instance may the President, in enforcing the laws, assert a power that
Congress has the power to assert unless Congress has expressly authorized him to do so, represents an extreme position in attempting to draw
an uncompromising line between legislative power and executive
authority. 12° Certainly it is true that under the Constitution legislative
power is vested solely in the Congress. But it is doubtful whether such
a clear and sharp distinction between legislative and executive functions
can always be drawn. Practical considerations require a recognition
120 Distrust of the process of judicial review in so far as it leads courts to weigh and
consider basic policy considerations has led Justice Black to adopt a technique ef constitutional interpretation which appears mechanical and inflexible because of its emphasis on
literal constructions of the text of the Constitution and the resulting formulation of constitutional absolutes. Thus he has taken issue with the "fundamental rights" interpretation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and has taken the position that
the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted solely by reference to the Bill of Rights.
See his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
He favors a rigid interpretation of the First Amendment limitations. See, for instance, his
dissenting opinions in American Communications Association, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950), and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857
(1951).
In cases dealing with the power of the states to impose burdens on interstate commerce, Justice Black's general position has been that the states have power to regulate and
to tax such commerce as long as such measures are not discriminatory and are not in conflict with federal legislation. See his dissenting opinions in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515 (1945), and Gwin, White & Price v. Henneford, 305 U.S.
434, 59 S.Ct. 325 (1939). In more recent cases he has conceded a willingness to employ
the technique of weighing national against local interests in passing on state police legislation alleged to violate the Commerce Clause. See his concurring opinion in Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946), and his dissenting opinion in Hood & Sons
v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 657 (1949). His general position that the grant of
power to Congress to regulate commerce does not preclude non-discriminatory state legislation unless in conflict with affirmative legislation of Congress suggests an interesting
comparison with the point of view expressed in the Youngstown case that the President
may not exercise any powers which fall within the sphere of the legislative powers of Congress uuless Congress has expressly authorized the same. See note 2 supra where the writer
raised the question whether the problem relating to state power in areas of congressional
authority parallels the problem of executive prerogative in these same areas. It will be
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that these two authorities may overlap or merge in limited areas,1 21
although no doubt should be entertained on the proposition that in
these areas executive authority must yield to legislative supremacy.
On the other hand, the positions taken by the dissenting justices are
open to serious objections. The notion that the President has a wide
choice of means that he may initiate to carry into effect the general
program and policies of Congress except to the extent that a particular
method of procedure has been expressly denied by Congress states
too broad a view of executive power. To the executive a number of
measures may seem appropriate for implementing legislative policy.
Perhaps in a time of emergency it might appear appropriate to conscript manpower for industry, to levy additional taxes to finance the
legislative program, to impose more severe penalties on those who violate
the laws. But it would hardly be contended that presidential prerogative would extend to these areas of legislative authority. Nor is it an
adequate answer to say that Congress, if it is displeased with the exercise
of executive prerogative, may take positive action to deny or disaffirm
the President's actions. Certainly it should be enough to show that the
President's action is inconsistent with the remedies and procedures
previously prescribed by Congress. The burden should not be placed
on Congress to take positive steps to negate an overreaching in the
assertion of executive authority. Positive disaffirmance of the President's action is not as easy as the dissenting opinion would make it
appear to be. The President by vetoing such overriding legislation
could frustrate majority action of Congress in order to maintain his
prerogative. Even more serious are the political difficulties in such a
situation. A legislative proposal to disaffirm executive action could
readily be stigmatized as a censure carrying political overtones and
inviting partisan controversy which would cloud the merits of the
question. Moreover, as the country's experience in the handling of
foreign affairs amply demonstrates, presidential initiative opens the
remembered that Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) I
(1824), took the position that the grant to Congress of plenary legislative power over the
subject deprived the states of power to regulate interstate commerce.
121 Thus the power of the President to enter into treaties with the approval of the
Senate or to negotiate executive agreements may overlap the power of Congress to regulate
foreign commerce, and the power of the President as Commander in Chief may to some
extent overlap the power of Congress to enact appropriate legislation to control the disposition of the armed forces, procure military supplies, etc. See notes 15 and 25 supra.

182

MICHIGAN

LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 51

way for the executive fait accompli often leaving no choice for Congress except to follow the course prescribed by the President.122
Faced with the necessity of choice between Congress and the
President, the ~upreme Court in the Youngstown case revealed its
fundamental predilection by subordinating executive authority to legislative power in the handling of domestic matters. In making this choice
and thereby expressing its faith in the strength and adequacy of the
legislative process within the framework of a system of representative
government, the Court has made a notable contribution to our
constitutional democracy.
122 See ConWIN, ToTAL WAR AND THB CoNsnTOTION

22-34 (1947).

